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The directors of such [joint stock] companies, however, being the managers 
rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well he expected, 
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which 
partners in a _private copartnery frequently watch over their own . ... Negli-
gence and profusion, therefore, must always _prevail, more or less, in the man-
agement of the qffairs of such a company. 
Adam Smith1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1971, Eric Stein published an account of the remarkable progress of 
the European Economic Community (EEC) toward a harmonized law of 
business corporations.2 The progress was particularly striking from an 
American viewpoint, because the harmonization was achieved by moving 
toward the more rigorous of the various national standards, in contrast to 
the "race of laxity"3 or "race for the bottom"4 that has characterized the 
movement toward uniformity in the corporation laws of U.S. states. 
At the time of Professor Stein's publication, most of the harmonization 
was in the form of proposals, rather than of laws in force. By 1984, nine 
directives for uniformity had been adopted in five sectors of corporate af-
fairs. 5 These sectors may be summarily characterized as organization, capi-
1. A. SMITH, 3 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
124 (1796). For a contemporary correlation of organizational theory with Adam Smith's ideol-
ogy, see Marris and Mueller, The Corporation, Competition, and the Invisible Hand, 18 J. EcoN. 
LIT. 32 (1980). 
2. E. STEIN, THE HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS (1971). 
3. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558-59 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
4. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon .Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 
(1974). For a challenge to Cary's evaluation, see R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPO· 
RATION 7-11 (1978); Fischel, The "Race lo the Bollom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent .Devel-
opments in .Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913 (1982). 
5. Premiere Directive du Conseil 68/151/CEE, tendant a cotlrdonner, pour les rendre 
equivalentes, les garanties qui sont exigees, dans !es Etats membres, des societes au sens de 
!'article 58 deuxieme alinea de traite, pour proteger les interets tant des associes que des tiers, 
11 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 65) 8 (Mar. 14, 1968), English translation reprinted in l COMMON 
MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 1351 (on companies); Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC, on coordina-
tion of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are re-
quired by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of article 
58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the 
maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to malting such safeguards equivalent, 
20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 26) l (Jan. 31, 1977), reprinted in l COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 
1355 (on information of public limited liability companies); Third Council Directive 
78/855/EEC, based on article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty concerning mergers of public limited 
liability companies, 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 295) 36 (Oct. 20, 1948), reprinted in l COM• 
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 1361 (on mergers); Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC, based on 
article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 21 O,J, 
EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 11 (Aug. 14, 1978), reprinted in 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 1371 
(on annual accounts); Council Directive 79/279/EEC, coordinating the conditions for the ad-
mission of securities to official stock exchange listing, 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 66) 21 (Mar. 
16, 1979), reprinted in l COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 1721 (on conditions for listing on ex-
change); Council Directive 80/390/EEC, coordinating the requirements for the drawing up, 
scrutiny and distribution of the listing particulars to be published for the admission of securi-
ties to official stock exchange listing, 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 100) l (Apr. 17, 1980), re-
printed in l COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 1731 (on data to be published on exchange listing); 
Council Directive 82/121/EEC, on information to be published on a regular basis by compa-
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talization, merger, accounting, and the extra disclosure requirements of 
companies whose securities are traded on stock exchanges. 
One major sector of corporate affairs, however, stubbornly resisted the 
Community's harmonization efforts. This was the area dealing with the 
composition and powers of the governing organs (in the United States, of-
ficers and directors) of the corporation. The same area has been the subject 
of debate during the past decade in the United States,6 provoking the radi-
cal proposals of Ralph Nader and Christopher Stone,7 the bold reform bills 
of Senator Metzenbaum and Congressman Rosenthal, 8 and the discreet ex-
hortations of the American Law Institute.9 The present Article reviews 
briefly the foci of debate in the Community and analyzes the responses of 
law to parallel problems in the United States. 
In the European Economic Community, the governing structure of cor-
porations became the subject of the proposed "Fifth Directive,"10 which 
retained its ordinal even though it will be, if ever adopted, not less than 
tenth in order of approval. 
This directive, as proposed by the Commission in 1972, contained two 
features that aroused major opposition. One of these was the two-tier struc-
ture of governance. The upper tier was a supervisory council, 11 which 
would select and remove executives, 12 and from which executives would be 
nies the shares of which have been admitted to official stock exchange listing, 25 O.J. EuR. 
COMM. (No. L 48) 26 (Feb. 20, 1982), reprinted in l COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 1741 (on 
periodic disclosure by issuers of listed securities); Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC, based 
on article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty, concerning the division of public limited liability companies, 
25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 378) 47 (Dec. 31, 1982), reprinted in 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 
~ 1411 (on division of public limited liability companies); Seventh Council Directive 83/349/ 
EEC, based on the article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts, 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. 
(No. L 193) I (July 18, 1983), reprinted in I COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 1421 (on consoli-
dated accounts). 
6. For a compendium of diverse opinions, see COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUC-
TURE AND GOVERNANCE (D. Schwartz ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARIES]. 
7. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 118-31 and 
passim (1976) [hereinafter cited as R. NADER]; C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL 
CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 122-83 and passim (1975). 
8. S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 7, 992-95 (1980); H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1980). 
9. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. I, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Tent. Draft No. I]; PRINCIPLES 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984) 
[hereinafter cited as Tent. Draft No. 2]; PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Tent. Draft No. 3]. 
The pronouncements in this document consist chiefly of statements about how corporations 
"should" be structured (Tent. Draft No. 2, §§ 2.01-3.03), what is good "corporate practice" (id. 
at §§ 3.04-3.07), and what procedures will shield corporate decisions from judicial merit review 
(Tent. Draft No. 3, §§ 5.08-5.16). 
10. Commission Directive, Proposition d'une cinquieme directive tendant a coordonner Jes 
garanties qui sont exigees dans les Etats membres, des societes, au sens de l'article 58 
paragraphe 2 du traite, pour proteger Jes inter~ts, tant des associes que des tiers en ce qui 
concerne la structure des societes anonymes ainsi que Jes pouvoirs et obligations de leurs or-
ganes, art. 58, 15 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. C 131) 49 (Oct. 13, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Fifth 
Directive 1972]. 
11. Id. art. 2. 
12. Id. art. 3. 
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excluded. 13 The lower tier was a managing board composed of executives, 
which would conduct the ordinary business of the company without inter-
ference from the supervisory board.14 
The other major subject of controversy was the representation of em-
ployees in the supervisory councils of companies with 500 or more employ-
ees.15 Alternative modes of representation were specified. Under one, 
which resembled some provisions of German law, 16 at least one third of the 
supervisory council members had to be chosen by employees or employee 
representatives. 17 Under the other, which was analogous to some provi-
sions of Netherlands law, 18 the supervisory council would appoint its own 
members, but shareholders and employees could veto the appointments by 
majorities of votes cast in their respective meetings. 19 
These proposals aroused in Europe opposition fully as vigorous as they 
would have aroused in the United States. For eleven years they were de-
bated, revised, redebated, and re-revised.20 In 1983, the Commission put 
forward a revised Fifth Directive designed to appease its critics while 
achieving the principal objectives of the original proposal.21 
With respect to the supervision of managers, the Fifth Directive of 1983 
offered a choice between the original two-tier structure and a one-tier struc-
ture in which a majority of the members would be nonexecutives.22 With 
respect to the participation of employees in the supervision of large compa-
nies, the Fifth Directive of 1983 raised the threshold to 1000 employees23 
and offered an expanded variety of choices. It preserved the options based 
on the German model of election of one third to one half of the supervisory 
council members by employees,24 and the Netherlands model of co-opta-
tion subject to objection by employees.25 The elective method was ex-
tended to one-tier boards by requiring that employees should elect one 
third to one half of the nonexecutive members of these boards.26 Another 
alternative, adaptable equally to one-tier and two-tier boards, relinquished 
the requirement of employee representation on supervisory councils, but set 
up a parallel council of employee representatives who would receive the 
13. Id art. 6. 
14. Id art. 2. 
IS. Id art. 4. The requirement was applied to companies with 500 or more employees. 
16. Aktiengesetz [AktG] §§ 95-116, 1965 BGBI I 1109 (W. Ger.); THE GERMAN STOCK 
CORPORATION LAW§§ 95-116 (R. Mueller & E. Galbraith trans. 2d ed. 1976). 
17. Fifth Directive 1972, supra note 10, at art. 4(2). 
18. Burgerlijk Wetboek [B.W.) bk. 2, art. 158(6) (13th ed. 1983) (Neth.). 
19. Fifth Directive 1972, supra note 10, at art. 4(3). 
20. See Welch, The Ftfih .Directive -A False .Dawn?, 8 EUR. L. R. 83 (1983). 
21. Commission Directive, Amended proposal for a Fifth Directive founded on article 
54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty concerning the structure of public limited companies and the pow-
ers and obligations of their organs, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (Aug. 19, 1983) [herein-
after cited as Fifth Directive 1983). 
22. Id arts. 2(1), 3(1), 21a(l). 
23. Id arts. 4(1), 21b. 
24. Id art. 4b. 
25. Id art. 4c. 
26. Id art. 21d. 
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same information and consider the same questions as the shareholder 
boards, but who would have only consultative functions.27 Finally, mem-
ber states could allow their companies to invent their own forms of em-
ployee representation by collective bargaining with labor unions.28 
In the United States, developments have taken a very different tum. 
The question of employee representation has not yet excited much debate,29 
but the establishment of independent supervision is the focus of consider-
able development and controversy.30 On the side of supervision, the New 
York Stock Exchange requires that its listed companies maintain an audit-
ing committee of nonexecutive directors.31 The Corporate Laws Commit-
tee's Director's Guide of 1979 recommended exclusion of executives from 
committees on compensation and nomination, and maintenance of nonex-
ecutive directors on the whole board.32 By 1980, a majority oflarger corpo-
rations had majorities ofnonexecutive directors.33 In 1982, a tentative draft 
of the American Law Institute declared that the law "should" require that a 
majority of the board members in the larger corporations34 be 
nonexecutives. 
One would hardly be surprised if corporate executives, like physicians, 
lawyers, professors and other clans, would see no advantage in providing 
outside supervision. The American Society of Corporate Secretaries found 
the recommendation of nonexecutive majorities inappropriate for some 
companies,35 and the exclusion of executives from the nominating commit-
27. Id. arts. 4d, 2le. 
28. Id. arts. 4e, 2lf. 
29. See Su=ers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative 
Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367 (1980). 
30. See Staff of Senate Co=. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 427-582 (Co=. Print 1980) [herein-
after cited as STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY]; Business Roundtable, The 
Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 
Bus. LAW. 2083 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Roundtable 1978]; Leech & Mundheim, The 
Outside Director of the Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 1799 (1976); Ruder, Current 
Issues between Corporations and Shareholders: Private Sector Responses to Proposals for Fed-
eral Intervention Into Corporate Governance, 36 Bus. LAW. 771 (1981); Williams, Corporate 
Accountability, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, at 513, 521. 
31. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, THE New YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY 
MANUAL § 303.00 (1983). 
32. Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1625-26 (1978) [hereinafter cited 
as Guidebook]. 
33. In 1980, the Wall Street Joumalreported that "outside" directors constituted majorities 
of the boards of 87.6% of "major U.S. corporations." Ingrassia, Outsider Dominated Boards 
Grow, Spurred by Calls for Independence, Wall St. J., Nov. 3, 1980, at 33, col. 4. For reports of 
earlier surveys by the Conference Board, see Guidebook, supra note 32, at 1643-44. For data 
gathered by the SEC, see STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 30, at 
598, 600. 
34. Tent. Draft No. 1, supra note 9, at§ 3.03. The class of corporations affected comprised 
those with 200 or more shareholders of record and $100,000,000 or more in assets. See id. at 
§ 1.15. This principle was demoted in 1984 to a rule of good corporate practice. Tent. Draft 
No. 2, supra note 9, at § 3.04. 
35. Corporate Director's Guidebook: Comments Submitted by the American Society of Cor-
porate Secretaries, 33 Bus. LAW. 321, 322 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Secretarieij. 
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tee inappropriate in all companies.36 Choosing their own successors is 
among the prime responsibilities of executives, the Secretaries said.37 The 
Business Roundtable, which is generally representative of chief executives, 
decries all legal requirements of disinterested membership on the board.38 
II. THE INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISION 
A. The Theory of Independent Supervision 
A credulous reader of state corporation codes, federal proxy rules, and 
corporation reports could easily conclude that independent supervision of 
management is firmly entrenched at two levels. Shareholders elect directors 
and can remove them;39 they receive information on corporate affairs from 
annual reports and proxy statements from registered companies;40 if they 
fail to receive reports, or find the reports insufficient, they may inform 
themselves by exercising their rights of inspection.41 Directors in tum ap-
point and remove officers,42 and manage or direct the management of the 
corporation's business.43 
The reality is well known to be quite different. Most shareholdings in 
companies of all sizes are too small to justify individual shareholders' mak-
ing the effort required to ferret out the facts and to organize a nonexecutive 
group to supervise executives. In large companies, the problem is compli-
cated by the impracticability of reaching and persuading the tens of 
thousands of shareholders who would have to combine their forces to exert 
influence. As a result, most shareholders mark their proxies in favor of 
directors whom the managers have nominated. In the end, the managers 
have chosen their own supervisors. 
Berle and Means estimated in 1932 that nearly two thirds of the largest 
corporations were controlled by the managers with no substantial input 
from shareholders.44 John Calhoun Baker showed in 1937 that in some of 
the very largest corporations almost all the directors were full-time employ-
36. Id at 331-33. 
37. Id at 331. 
38. Roundtable 1978, supra note 30, at 2105-13; BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT OF 
THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS" 17-
35 (1983) [hereinafter cited as ROUNDTABLE 1983). 
39. E.g., General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (Supp. 1982) (re-
moval); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (Supp. 1982) (election); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT 
§ 36 (1979) (election); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 39 (1974) (removal). 
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1983). 
41. General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 1982); MODEL BUSI-
NESS CORP. ACT § 52 (1979). 
42. General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (Supp. 1982); MODEL BUSI• 
NESS CORP. ACT§§ 50-51 (1979). 
43. General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1982); MODEL BUSI• 
NESS CORP. ACT § 35, ~ 1 (1979). 
44. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 94 
(1933). This source classified 44% of the 200 largest corporations as under "management con-
trol," meaning that managers controlled through proxy voting, without the aid of other de-
vices. Another 21% were estimated to be controlled through a "legal device" such as a voting 
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ees of the corporation or its subsidiaries;45 they were consequently subordi-
nates of the chief executive whom they nominally supervised. Today, most 
of the largest corporations have majorities of nonexecutives on their 
boards,46 but there is no legal compulsion to do so. 
Leading industrial countries outside the United States have required 
publicly held companies to provide for supervision of managers by 
nonmanagers. In Germany, where supervision is most fully developed, a 
supervisory council (Aefstichsrat) has been required since 1870.47 In its 
modem form, this council hires and fires the managers, sets their compensa-
tion, and supervises their management.48 But the council cannot undertake 
acts of management, and none of its members can be managers.49 
In France, supervision of managers was introduced in 1863, through of-
ficers called commissaires.50 Although the term is usually translated as "au-
ditors,"51 the tasks of these officers would be better conveyed by calling 
them "inspectors" or even "commissars."52 Under the current law, they are 
specifically charged not only with verifying the accuracy of the information 
supplied to shareholders in the directors' annual report, but also with mak-
ing sure that all shareholders receive equal treatment, notifying the share-
holders of any "irregularities" discovered by them, and even notifying the 
State Prosecutor of any offense of which they have knowledge.53 
Great Britain has never required companies to set up an organ of con-
tinuous oversight, but has provided since 1862 for independent inspection 
of company affairs by a governmental agency known formerly as the Board 
of Trade, and currently as the Secretary for Trade and lndustry.54 The 
causes of inspection are fraudulent or unlawful purposes, oppression of 
trust, so that a total of 65% appeared to be controlled by persons without substantial invest-
ment in the enterprise. 
45. J. BAKER, DIRECTORS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 24 (1945). 
46. Ingrassia, supra note 33. 
47. See R. WIETHOLTER, INTERESSEN UNO ORGANISATION DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFI' IM 
AMERIKANISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN RECHT 285-87 (Berkeley-Klllner Rechtsstudien, Klllner, 
Reihe No. 1, 1961); Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the Ger-
man, so HARV. L. REV. 23, 50-51 (1966). 
48. AktG §§ 84(1), 87(1), lll(l), 1965 BGBl I 1106-07, lll4 (W. Ger.). 
49. AktG §§ 105(1), lll(4), 1965 BGBl I lll3-14 (W. Ger.). 
50. 2 J. HEMARD, F. TERRE & P. MABILAT, Soc1ETES CoMMERCIALES 587-90 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as J. HEMARD]. 
51. See, e.g., J. CRABB, FRENCH BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 68 (1979); French Law on Com-
mercial Companies, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) art. 218, at 108 (Jan. I, 1971) [hereinafter 
cited as French Law on Commercial Companies (CCH)]. 
52. J. HEMARD, supra note 50. At one time there was thought of naming them commis-
saires censeurs (literally, "commissar-censors"). Id at 588. 
53. Loi no. 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966 sur les societes commerciales, arts. 228, 233, 1966 J.O. 
6402, 6419, 6420, 1966 D.S. 265, 278 [hereinafter cited as French Law on Commercial Compa-
nies]. For English translations, see J. CRABB, supra note 51, at 15, 69, 71; French Law on 
Commercial Companies (CCH), supra note 5 I, at 33, 111, 113. 
54. An Act for the Incorporation, Regulation, and Winding-up of Trading Companies and 
other Associations (The Companies Act), 1862, 25 & 26 Viet., ch. 89, §§ 56-59; Companies Act, 
1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, §§ 164-69. The functions of the Board of Trade are now exer-
cised by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry pursuant to The Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry Order 1970, No. 1537, § 2(1), 1970 STAT. INST. 5293, 5293 (1971). 
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shareholders, misfeasance, misconduct, or failure to give the shareholders 
"all the information with respect to its affairs which they might reasonably 
expect."55 If the inspection reveals that the affairs of the company are be-
ing conducted "in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of 
some part of the members," a court may make a variety of remedial 
orders.56 
The historic purpose of supervision in these systems has been the protec-
tion of property interests - primarily those of shareholders, but possibly 
also of bondholders and other creditors.57 Since World War II, the sug-
gested purposes of supervision have sometimes been expanded to include 
protection of general public interests.58 In order to avoid confusing issues, 
this Article analyzes supervision first as it relates to property protection. A 
later part of the Article deals with modifying supervision to protect em-
ployee interests. The engaging question of supervision for other public in-
terests is outside the scope of the present inquiry. 59 
Provisions for supervision of management are based on two assump-
tions. The first one is that managers are normally competent, loyal and fair. 
They should be allowed to manage the business without pervasive interven-
tion of supervisors. The German law specifically forbids the allocation of 
management powers to the supervisory board.60 Although the Fifth Direc-
tive of 1983 lacks the express prohibition of German law, it distinctly as-
signs managerial powers to one board and supervisory powers to another in 
the two-tier system.61 In the one-tier system, it specifies that the executive 
members of the board shall manage and the nonexecutive members shall 
supervise.62 A similar division of functions is recognized in the Corporate 
Director's Guidebook of the American Bar Association's Corporate Laws 
Committee,63 and implicitly by the authorization in the Delaware and 
Model acts for the board to "direct" rather than "manage" the business of 
55. Companies Act, 1948, ch. 38, § 165. 
56. Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, § 75. This section added "unfairly prejudicial" to the 
grounds of court orders, and authorized individual shareholders, in addition to the Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry, to seek judicial correction. 
57. The duty to shareholders was generally implicit in the specifications of liability to the 
"company." But supervisory members could be liable under some circumstances to creditors 
or to liquidators for the benefit of creditors. An express recognition of other interests was the 
notorious injunction of the German Stock Corporation Act of 1937 to manage so as to advance 
the welfare of the enterprise and its personnel, and the general good of the people and the 
nation ("wie das Wohl des Betriebs und seiner Gefolgscheft und der gemeine Nulzen von Volk 
und Reich es fardem'). Gesetz Uber Aktiengesellschaften und Kommanditgesellschaften auf 
Aktien [Aktiengesetz] 70(1), 1937 RGBI I 107, 120 (W. Ger.). 
58. See R. NADER, supra note 7, at 118-28; C. STONE, supra note 7, at 30-34. For Great 
Britain, see Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, §§ 46, 74, requiring directors at all times to have 
regard to the interests of employees and authorizing them in cases of sale of a business to make 
arrangement for employees at the expense of shareholders. 
59. Literature on representation of noninvestor constituencies is reviewed in Conard, Re-
.flee/ions on Public Interest .Directors, 15 MICH. L. REV. 941 (1977). 
60. AktG § lll(4), 1965 BGBI I 1114 (W. Ger.). 
61. Fifth Directive 1983, supra note 21, art. 3(1)-(a). 
62. Id at art. 2la(l). 
63. Guidebook, supra note 32, at 1619-20. The Corporate Laws Committee is an organ of 
the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association. 
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the corporation.64 
The second assumption of the supervision arrangement is that some 
managers sometimes will lack competence or lose competence that they 
once had; that some managers would, if unrestrained, undertake imprudent 
expansions or make overgenerous arrangements for their own benefit; and 
that some would, on occasion, favor some sectors of security holders over 
others. In order to inhibit these deviations, and to deter them, supervisors 
are established who are sufficiently removed from management to view it 
objectively, and sufficiently powerful to decide who shall be managers and 
for how long. 
The theory does not ignore the agency of other forces for good manage-
ment. Managerial ethics is the most potent force, but ethics occasionally 
succumbs to vanity and ambition. Product markets and securities provide 
discipline,65 but they sometimes offer rewards for mismanagement, as in 
manipulation of information for trading gains. Derivative suits provide de-
terrents to mismanagement,66 but very irregularly and expensively. Super-
vision can be quicker and cheaper than derivative suits or market forces, 
and can fill gaps in managerial ethics. 
The theory of supervision, as outlined above, is not immune to attack. 
If one were to accept without reservation some of the rosy descriptions of 
the discipline of the market, and the "market for control,"67 one might con-
clude that supervision is superfluous, although the authors of these descrip-
tions do not seem to have gone quite so far. The main contention of these 
theorists is that the market will indicate to investors how much supervision 
is optimal.68 Governments should not interfere with investors' freedom to 
choose the form and intensity of supervision. 
The present Article does not pursue this intriguing question of legisla-
tive policy. Instead, it operates within the postulates of known corporate 
codes, all of which contain supervisory requirements; it examines the dif-
ferences in the procedures and speculates on the consequences that are 
likely to flow from these differences .. 
B. The Effects ef Independent Supervision 
The practical effects of establishing a structure of independent supervi-
64. General Corporation Law, DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (Supp. 1982); MODEL BUSI-
NESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1979). 
65. See Lorie, An Economist's Perception L· A View On the Need to Revise Corporation 
Statutes, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, at 51, 58; Weston, Economist's Perception IL· Large 
Corporations and Corporate Governance, in COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, at 61, 72; Wolfson, A 
Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959 (1980). 
66. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Co., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.); Bren-
dle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (Rifkind, J.); Dykstra, The Revival of the 
Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 77-82 (1967). 
67. See R. WINTER, supra note 4, at 16-28; Manne, Mergers and the Market far Corporate 
Control, 73 J. PoL. EcoN. 110 (1965). 
68. See R. WINTER, supra note 4, at 25-26; Fama, Agency Problems and the 17zeory of the 
Firm, 88 J. POL. EcoN. 288 (1980); Manne, supra note 67, at 119-20; see generally Jensen & 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 
J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976) (outlining an economic theory of the market's role in determining 
corporate management behavior). 
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sion are problematic. Victor Brudney captured the uncertainty in the title, 
17ze Independent Directors: Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?69 
The most optimistic hypothesis is that corporations with independent 
supervision would enjoy a better selection of managers, wiser choices in 
major corporate actions, and greater impartiality in the treatment of various 
groups of investors. 
A second possibility is that corporations with independent supervision 
would operate indistinguishably from corporations without it, because in-
dependent directors would be unable or unwilling to overrule or remove the 
managers. 
A third eventuality is that corporations with independent supervision 
would operate less efficiently and less fairly than corporations without 
them. This could happen because nonexecutive directors would know less 
than executive directors about the enterprise and because the facade of su-
pervision would block judicial control of mismanagement. 
Puckish colleagues have suggested that these three alternatives be 
nicknamed the House of Commons model, the House of Lords model, and 
the Supreme Soviet model. Although these images illuminate some aspects 
of the alternatives, this essay will employ the less colorful terms, authorita-
tive supervision, advisory supervision and deferential supervision. 
The dominant variable in supervision, as in corporate management and 
in parliamentary chambers, will always be the quality of the supervisors -
their intelligence, their integrity and their courage.70 Without these quali-
ties in the supervisors, corporate structures are largely irrelevant. But cor-
porate structures are relevant to the utility or futility of possessing these 
qualities. They are even more relevant to the impulse of executives to pro-
cure directors who have these qualities or directors who lack them. The 
following pages contain a discussion of circumstances that are favorable or 
unfavorable to the exercise of effective supervision. 
I. Authoritative Supervision 
Authoritative supervision is easily envisioned in a corporation in which, 
for example, all the shares are held in about twenty separate blocks of ap-
proximately equal size, and each block is worth $100,000 or more. Under 
these circumstances, the owners of each block have financial interests that 
are big enough to induce them to spend some time and effort protecting 
their investment. Since there is no public market in such a closely held 
company, the shareholders do not generally have the alternative of selling 
69. Bradney, The Independent .Directors: Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. 
REv. 597 (1982). "Heavenly City" is an allusion to the dream of a rational society recounted 
in C. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS (1932), 
and in a chapter in P. GAY, THE PARTY OF HUMANITY (1964). "Potemkin Village" is an 
allusion to false facades constructed by General Potemkin to please Catherine the Great in her 
tours of the countryside, as recounted by JOAN HASLIP, CATHERINE THE GREAT, 319-20 
(1977). See also Feis, Is Shareholder .Democracy Possible?, 31 Bus. LAW, 621 (1976); Haft, 
Business .Decisions by the New Board· Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. 
REv. I (1981); Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of .Directors: Fond Hope-Faint 
Promise?, 76 MICH. L. REV. 581 (1978). 
70. 3 THE CONFERENCE BOARD, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES 19-20 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES]. 
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out at a fair price. Furthermore, they cannot all be chief executives. Lack-
ing other means of protecting their individual interests, they are impelled to 
combine to obtain the best obtainable managers and to watch them closely. 
a. Dispersed holdings. As the facts diverge from this example, the 
probability diminishes that authoritative supervision by shareholder repre-
sentatives will be exercised. As the holdings become more numerous and 
comprise smaller fractions of the share capital, the difficulties of corralling a 
coalition for the election of directors are aggravated. At the same time, the 
market is broadened, and the possibility of selling out instead of struggling 
becomes more attractive. As the value of the blocks decreases, the incentive 
to spend time and money on the corporation's affairs is attenuated. When 
shareholders stop making their own choices of directors, directors are cho-
sen by the managers. For these reasons, the probability of authoritative 
supervision of management in the most widely held corporations is remote. 
This is the situation that has been characterized as "management con-
trol,"71 or as "managerialism."72 
Managerialism may be contrasted with "capitalism" in the early twenti-
eth century sense of control by the suppliers of capital.73 Although Berle 
and Means planted the inference that managerialism involves a subversion 
of the private property system,74 some more recent writers contend that it is 
the essence of the private property system.75 Their perpective is supported 
by theories about the "market for control," which brings enterprises into the 
hands of the managers who produce the greatest returns for investors.76 
In Germany, where the two-tier supervisory system originated, a 
number of practices and legal prescriptions tend to protect the supervisory 
board from being captured by the managers. Since most shares are embod-
ied in bearer certificates, the issuing corporations have no way of communi-
cating directly with most of the shareholders. They depend on the banks to 
obtain the proxies that are needed for shareholders' meetings.77 The banks 
71. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 44, at 84-90. 
72. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 24 (1976); cf. Werner, Corpo-
ration Law in Search of its Future, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 1611, 1660 (1981) (criticizing the tradi-
tional managerial model for not conforming to traditional legal principles); see generally R. 
MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF 'MANAGERIAL' CAPITALISM (1964). 
73. WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1932) defined capitalism (among other 
ways) as "An economic system in which capital or capitalists play the principal part .... " A 
capitalist was defined as "One who has capital; one who has capital for investment, or capital 
invested; esp., a person oflarge property which is or may be employed in business." The 1968 
definition of capitalism omits any reference to capitalists playing a "principal part," and sub-
stitutes a reference to "private decision rather than . . . government control." Perhaps a new 
term such as "investorism" is needed to preserve the idea that was formerly embodied in "cap-
italism." Since the meaning of this term would not be readily recognized by readers, this 
Article adheres to "capitalism" in what may be an outmoded sense. 
74. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 44, at 247-76. 
75. See, e.g., Werner, supra note 72, at 1629-44. 
76. See R. WINTER, supra note 4, at 18-28; Manne, supra note 67, at 112. 
77. The system is described and evaluated by Bernhard Grossfeld in Grossfeld, Manage-
ment and Control of Marketable Share Companies, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 98-101 (A. Conard ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Grossfeld]; A. RUECK, 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 164-67 (1970); H. WURDINGER, AKTIEN- UND KONZERNRECHT 69-71 
(1973); Grossfeld & Ebke, Probleme der Untemehmensverfassung in rechtshistorischer und 
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do not solicit proxies to be exercised by the management's proxy committee 
(as in the United States), but proxies to be exercised by the banks them-
selves.78 Although the banks cast most of the ballots, the supervisors whom 
they elect are predominantly shareholders, with a sprinkling of banks' rep-
resentatives, "experts" Qawyers, accountants, engineers, etc.), and others.79 
The banks that exercise the shareholders' proxies must tell the share-
holders how they intend to vote if uninstructed, and follow the sharehold-
ers' instructions if any are given.80 Unlike brokers who hold customers' 
shares in the United States,81 they are free to oppose the managers' propos-
als if they have announced their intentions in advance and have not been 
instructed otherwise. 
In practice, there is very little conflict between the banks and the man-
agers; one can hardly tell whether the banks are accommodating the man-
agers, or vice versa.82 If, however, the managers should disagree with the 
supervisory board, they would have no means of going over the heads of 
their board with an appeal to shareholders. Although the law does not ex-
pressly say so, German jurists believe that managers are implicitly forbid-
den to participate in a proxy solicitation. 83 
Whether independent supervision will have the same effects in other 
Community countries that it has in Germany is questionable, because of 
differences in proxy solicitation. One can be fairly certain that it would not 
work in the United States as it works in Germany, primarily because U.S. 
financial institutions would be unlikely to use their voting power as actively 
as German banks do, even if they had as many votes at their disposal. 84 
rechtsvergleichender Sicht (II und Sch!uss), 22 AG 92-98 (1977). In 16 of the largest companies 
in which no single shareholder had a large holding, 92% of the shares present at the sharehold-
ers' meetings were found to be voted by banks or investment companies. BERICHT DER 
STUDIENKOMMISSION: GRUNDSATZFRAGEN DER KREDITWIRTSCHAFT 111 (Schriftenreihe des 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen No. 28, 1979) [hereinafter cited as BERJCHT DER 
STUDIENKOMMISSION]. 
78. Although the corporation code speaks of proxies being given to a bank and exercised 
by the "bank," AktG § 135(1), 1965 BGBI I 1120 (W. Ger.), the bank must inevitably delegate 
the exercise of the proxies to an individual. The individual who votes on behalf of the bank 
must be an employee of the bank, unless the bank has no branch in the city where the meeting 
is held, and has notified the shareholder that it will be represented by a nonemployee. AktG, 
§ 135(3). 
79. C. VOGEL, AKTIENRECHT UNO AKTIENWIRKLICHKEIT - ORGANISATION UNO AUF· 
GABENTEILUNG VON VoRSTAND UNO AUFSICHTSRAT 120-28 (1980). A significant number of 
directorships are also held by representatives of governmental bodies that hold shares in 
"mixed economy enterprises." According to a government study of codetermination, a panel of 
representative nominations is usually prepared by the managing board (Vorstand). 
MITBESTJMMUNGSKOMMISSJON, M!TBESTIMMUNG IM UNTERNEHMEN: BERICHT DER 
SACHVERSTANDJGENKOMMISSION ZUR AUSWERTUNG DER BJSHERIGEN ERFAHRUNGEN DEi 
DER MITBESTIMMUNG 32 (1970). 
80. AktG § 128, 1965 BGBI I 1118 (W. Ger.). 
81. See New York Stock Exchange, Rules 451-52, [2 Constitution and Rules] N.Y.S.E. 
GUIDE (CCH) ~ 2451-52. 
82. U. IMMENGA, AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, AKTIONARSINTERESSEN UNO INSTITUTIONELLE 
ANLEGER 9 (WALTER EUCKEN INSTITUT No. 28, 1971); Grossfeld & Ebke, supra note 77, at 
96. 
83. Grossfeld & Ebke, supra note 77, at 95. 
84. Factors inhibiting aggressive exercise of voting power by institutions are analyzed be-
low in part II.B.2 of this Article. 
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b. Concentrated holdings. If some of the shareholdings are substan-
tially larger than in the example sketched above, the probabilities are more 
complex. When the leader of the principal share block is not determined to 
be the chief executive, he is likely to induce active supervision by his own 
financial manager or by his nominees on the board. This situation proba-
bly existed in the Standard Oil Companies for several decades after the 
breakup of the original company. A historic example of its operation is 
illustrated by the forcing out of Colonel Stewart from the presidency of 
Standard Oil of Indiana, after he was indicted for perjury in connection 
with the Teapot Dome scandal.85 The situation also existed in General 
Motors when the Du Pont Company held a dominant block of shares. 86 
Although Du Pont may have influenced General Motors' choice of paints, 
lacquers, and upholstery,87 General Motors was regarded as an exemplar of 
efficient management in many respects.88 Contemporaneous examples of 
action led by holders of significant minority blocks of shares include 
Samuel Heyman's ouster of a chief executive of GAF Corporation on 
charges of mismanagement. 89 
If the leader of the dominant block aspires to executive power in the 
company, independent supervision vanishes, because the holder of supervi-
sory power has become a manager. The results may be excellent if the 
leader is talented, honest, and devoted to his job. The possible variations 
are suggested by the progress of the Ford Motor Company, which seemed 
to advance during the early years of leadership of Henry Ford II, but to 
slow down when the chiefs caprices led to rapid hirings and firings of 
Miller, Knudsen, and Iacocca.90 
Although the holding of a controlling block of shares may lead to effi-
cient operation of the business, it has no particular tendency to produce 
fairness among groups of shareholders. The controlling shareholder may 
favor itself. Du Pont may have imposed some costs (probably minuscule) 
on General Motors' minority shareholders by shifting GM's paint 
85. See P. GIDDENS, STANDARD OIL COMPANY (INDIANA): OIL PIONEER OF THE MIDDLE 
WEST 403-35 (1955). 
86. See United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 588 (1957) (Du 
Pont's influence on GM's choice of paints); see also Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. 
Supp. 960, 967-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (DuPont's influence on executive compensation policies). 
87. See 353 U.S. at 596. 
88. See P. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION passim (1946) [hereinafter cited as 
P. DRUCKER, CORPORATIONS]; R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORA-
TION 101, 110 and passim (1961); see generally P. DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT 
53 and passim (1954). 
89. GAF Holder Unveils Dissident Slate, Urges Werner to Debate Him, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 
1983, at 23, col. l; GAF Proxy Defeat Reflects Revolt by Impatient Institutional Holders, Wall 
St. J., May 12, 1983, at 35, col. 4; GAF Dissident's Victory Upheld in Appeals Court, Wall St. J., 
Dec. 9, 1983, at 4, col. 1. Another instance is the initiative of Howard Keck, owner of 12 
percent of Superior Oil, to oust the company's management. Keck's initiative was settled by 
the company's abandoning a charter amendment to repel a takeover bid. Superior Oil Proxy 
Batlle Studied by Keck, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 3, col. l; Superior Oil Co. Rescinds Issue of 
Preferred, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1983, at 2, col. 2. 
90. See Henry Ford's Bumpy Journey off into the Sunset, ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 1979, at 101; 
Ford After Henry II, Bus. WK., Apr. 30, 1979, at 62, 64-65. According to the Economist story, 
Ford's only explanation to Iacocca was "I just don't like you"; according to .Business Week, his 
statement to the board was: "Him or me." 
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purchases toward Du Pont.91 More significantly, Christiana (the Du Pont 
family holding company) may have induced Du Pont to make a favorable 
deal in the Christiana-Du Pont merger, at some expense to DuPont's other 
shareholders.92 Consequently, the concentration of shares in a controlling 
block may be less favorable to the entire body of shareholders than rela-
tively equal distribution of large blocks. But the latter arrangement is prac-
tically unavailable in most billion-dollar companies, so that single block 
control may be shareholders' best hope for active supervision. 
2. Advisory Supervision 
In most U.S. corporations, a majority of independent nonexecutive di-
rectors seems likely to produce no different effects than a minority. In 
either case, the presence of nonexecutives on the board is likely to be help-
ful.93 They will contribute viewpoints that are free of the biases of incum-
bent executives. Since most of them will have experience with other 
enterprises, they will bring additional observations to the attention of exec-
utives. Executives' desire to retain the outsiders' approval will exert some 
restraint on the self-serving exploits that might otherwise tempt them. 
But the independent directors will rarely if ever act to change the 
management.94 
a. The passivity of independent directors. The most likely behavior of 
nonexecutive directors who disapprove of the executives' course was dra-
matically illustrated in Bendix Company. When distinguished independent 
directors lost interest in Agee's program, they did not organize a movement 
to block or depose him; they resigned.95 
91. See JJu Pont, 353 U.S. at 595. The government's accusation did not imply that GM's 
purchases of Du Pont's products were uneconomical, but that they foreclosed competition of 
other suppliers. 
92. See E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977), where the Court 
sustained an exchange by which shareholders of Christiana Securities Co. received Du Pont 
shares worth more on the market than their Christiana shares. 
93. SeeJ. BAKER, supra note 45, at 131-38; M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 
10-42 (1971); R. WINTER, supra note 4, at 40-42; cf. P. DRUCKER, CORPORATIONS, supra note 
88, at 91-92 (although not the solution to corporate board reform, in some cases outside direc• 
tors may provide important contributions). 
94. See M. MACE, supra note 93, at 72-85. A Conference Board study declares that a direc• 
tor "must be willing to take on the unpleasant assignments that can go with the position, such 
as getting rid of incompetent management," but adds in the next sentence that "[t]he ultimate 
protest of a director, of course, is to resign from the board." DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES, supra 
note 70, at 20. 
95. For a news story on the resignation, see Rowan & Moore, Behind the Lines in t/1e 
Bendix War, FORTUNE, Oct. 18, 1982, at 157, 163. There seemed to be no way of knowing 
whether the resigning directors' loss of interest was occasioned by disapproval of Agee's ac-
tions, or by loyalty to Blumenthal (Agee's predecessor), or by the decline in status of their 
directorships that was incident to the acquisition by Allied Corporation. Among the non• 
executive directors who appeared on Bendix' board in the report for 1982 but not for 1983 
were Wilbur J. Cohen, Professor of Public Affairs at the University of Texas and former Secre-
tary of Health, Education and Welfare; Donald H. Rumsfeld, President and CEO of G.D. 
Searle Co. and former Secretary of Defense; William P. Tavoulareas, President of Mobil Cor-
poration; and Hugo E.R. Uyterhoeven, Professor at the Harvard Business School. [1982] 1 
MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1001; (1983] I MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 949. A year 
earlier Robert W. Purcell of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund had retired with a public statement 
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There are good reasons for independent directors to act as the Bendix 
directors did. Fighting the management is enormously costly in time, en-
ergy, and personal relations even when it is successful. If unsuccessful, it 
brings about an enormous loss of prestige, which is a director's stock in 
trade. 
The more conscientious an independent director is, the less likely he is 
to organize opposition to the management. Most independent directors 
(corporation executives, university executives or professors) have full-time 
obligations to other enterprises. To involve themselves in opposition to 
management would divert their energies from their primary loyalties. An 
independent director can be expected to take the risks and pay the costs of 
opposition only if he owes his primary loyalties to a large investor - if not 
a Rockefeller or a Du Pont, at least a Heyman. 
h. The passivity of .financial institutions. The passivity of directors in 
widely held corporations is probably not inevitable. Although there are few 
large family holdings in billion-dollar corporations, there are holdings in 
trust companies, investment companies, pension funds, and endowments 
that are large enough to form powerful coalitions.96 The SEC found in 1970 
that from 10 to 54 percent of the shares of the largest New York Stock 
Exchange companies were managed by institutions, with an average institu-
tional holding of 36 percent.97 A Senate staff study based on 1976 data 
placed the institutional fraction in a large group of companies at about 43 
percent.98 Although financial institutions generally support management in 
of" '[h]aving lost confidence in the top Bendix management and having tried without success 
to remedy the situation ... .'" Koten, Robert Purcell Quits as Bendix Director, Says He "Lost 
Confidence" in Management, Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1981, at 4, col. 2. At the time of the earlier 
resignation of Mr. Purcell, the nonexecutive directors outnumbered the executives. The other 
five nonexecutives (in addition to those who resigned between the 1982 and 1983 reports) were 
Coy G. Eklund, president and CEO of Equitable Assurance; Thomas P. Stafford, Vice Chair-
man of Gibraltar Exploration; John C. Fontaine, partner of Hughes, Hubbard & Reed; Jewel 
S. Lafontant, partner of Lafontant, Wilkins & Bintler; and Jonathan L. Scott, chairman and 
CEO of J.L. Scott Enterprises. There were only five executive directors - Agee, Hartz, Mc-
Donald, Purple, and Searby. [1982] I MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1001. 
Five other nonexecutive directors disappeared from the Bendix masthead between the 1980 
and 1981 reports - Malcolm Baldridge, Chairman and CEO of Scovill, Inc.; Henry B. Cun-
ningham, Honorary Chairman ofK-Mart; Paul S. Mirabito, Chairman and CEO of Burroughs 
Corp.; Allan E. Schwartz, partner of Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn; George R. Vila, 
former chairman of Uniroyal Corporation. [1980] I MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 702; 
[1981] 1 MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 777. Three of these (not designated) were reported to 
have resigned because of prospective conflicts of interest arising from Bendix' plans to acquire 
an interest in a "technology company.'' Koten, supra. 
96. See D. BAUM & N. STILES, THE SILENT PARTNERS: INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND 
CORPORATE CONTROL 53-80 (1965); J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 247-48 
(1958); see also P. BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 109-26 (1975) 
(illustrating the extent of institutional concentration); cf. Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: 
Reflections on Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 560 (1981) (discussing ef-
fect of corporation law on investment companies). 
97. 6 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY 
REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Summary Volume (1971) [hereinafter 
cited as INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY]; see also P. BLUMBERG, supra note 96, at 109-26. 
98. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT OF THE 
SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, VOTING RIGHTS IN MAJOR CORPORATIONS, S. 
Doc. No. 99, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978) [hereinafter cited as VOTING RIGHTS]. 
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elections of directors and votes on shareholder proposals,99 they more fre-
quently take opposing positions on defenses against takeover bids. 100 
The question arises why financial institutions do not organize to super-
vise management before the takeover crisis arrives. 101 The statement that 
they find it easier to sell out than to fight is not satisfying. Many of their 
blocks are too large to sell without depressing the market. If the price of 
their holdings has been depressed by poor management, improving man-
agement might be more economical than selling large blocks of shares. 
If a financial institution were to consider forming a group of institu-
tional holders to supervise managers, its lawyers would have to advise it of 
a number of dangers. The mere formation of a group might require public 
disclosure under an interpretation of the Securities Exchange Act. 102 The 
announcement would imply a negative view of incumbent management, 
which might depress share prices, and impair the performance record of the 
financial institution, as measured by market values of its holdings. 
If a group of institutions should be successful in installing directors of 
their choice, they would face additional complications. Their directors 
might be regarded as their deputies, so that the institutions' gains in short-
swing trading would have to be surrendered to the corporation. 103 This 
would disable the institution from serving efficiently the interests of its own 
investors. 
If the institutions were so successful that they installed a majority of 
directors of their choice, they might become "controlling persons" under 
the rules of the SEC.104 As such, they would have prima facie liability for 
any securities violations of the "controlled" companies, 105 and would be 
forbidden to sell large blocks of their own holdings without a new registra-
tion. 106 The holdings of the entire group would probably be aggregated in 
99. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 97, at 2749-826. 
100. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 97, at 2827-43. 
101. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 96, at 131-44; u. IMMENGA, supra note 82, at 23-30. 
102. "The history and language of section 13(d) make it clear that the statute was primarily 
concerned with disclosure of potential changes in control resulting from new aggregations of 
stockholdings and was not intended to be restricted to only individual stockholders who made 
future purchases and whose actions were, therefore, more apparent." GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 
453 F.2d 709, 718 (2d Cir. 1971) (interpreting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d), 15 
U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982)), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972). 
103. See Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969)(applying Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982)), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970). 
104. "Control" is defined by Securities Act Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1983) [here-
inafter cited as Sec. Act Regs.] and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Regulations, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.12b-2 (1983), as the power "to direct or cause the direction of the management •••• " 
105. Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
§ 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (1982). 
106. Under the Securities Act of 1933, §§ 2(4), 2(11), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(4), 77b(l l) (1982), 
anyone who sells on behalf of an issuer is classified as an "underwriter," and anyone who 
controls the issuer is classified as an issuer. Therefore, a broker who sells for a controlling 
person is an "underwriter," and sales by or through the broker are excluded from the broad 
exemption of 15 U.S.C. § 77d and are subject to the registration and prospectus requirements 
of 15 U.S.C. § 77e. United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 
U.S. 947 (1969). An exemption exists for sales in small amounts (known to the trade as "leak-
age") when a number of other conditions are fulfilled, but the limits are low enough to encum-
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determining the necessity of registration.107 
The deterrents to institutional activism posed by the Exchange Act (and 
the SEC's interpretations of it) present an ironic contrast with the purposes 
of another part of the Act - the proxy section. 108 This section imposes a 
heavy burden of disclosure to shareholders in solicitation of shareholders' 
preferences, presumably in order to establish shareholder control over man-
agers.109 But most of the shareholders who are big enough to exercise any 
influence are deterred from doing so by the SEC's control rules. Whether 
institutions would exert greater efforts to control management if they were 
relieved of these deterrents cannot be known so long as they are im-
peded.110 But it seems clear that their avenue to authoritative supervision 
has been strewn with mines. 
c. Potential impacts of activating control by .financial institutions. Al-
though institutional activism in the choice of directors is unlikely to arise, 
an estimate of its consequences is relevant to the advisability of reforming 
the law to make it feasible. 
On the positive side, institutionally-oriented directors would presum-
ably favor managers who maximize returns to the institutions. 111 Since 
these returns would be in the form of distributions or price appreciation, or 
both, the same benefits would flow to all shareholders. 
The negative aspects are more obscure. Although congressional investi-
gators seem to view with alarm the concentration of financial power in in-
stitutional investors, 112 the nature of the dangers is not clearly articulated. 
One worry has been that officers of a powerful institution sitting as directors 
on boards of different companies may cause them to patronize each other 
rather than competitors, 113 or restrain competitors from competing.114 
These perils, if they exist, seem likely to be diminished rather than aggra-
vated if numerous financial institutions combine to install their own nomi-
nees on boards, since a broader spectrum of interests would be represented. 
Another concern about institutional investors has been related chiefly to 
institutions that combine trust and commercial banking functions. 115 One 
fear is that trust departments might use their voting power to direct the 
her severely the liquidation of large blocks of shares. See Sec. Act Regs., 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 
(1983). 
107. Rule 144(e)(3)(vi), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(3)(vi) (1983). 
108. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982). 
109. Exchange Act Regulations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-l-.l4a-12 (1983). 
ll0. Some other deterrents to active participation in corporate affairs are reported in 5 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 97, at 2756-59. 
l l l. See J.A. LIVINGSTON, supra note 96, at 247-48. 
112. See VOTING RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 1-4. 
ll3. Id. at 20. 
114. E. HERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: COMMERCIAL BANK TRUST DEPARTMENTS 34 
(1975). 
115. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANK-
ING AND CURRENCY, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Commercial Banks and Their Trust 
Activities: Emerging Influence on the American Economy (Subcomm. Print 1968). See gener-
ally E. HERMAN, supra note 114. 
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business of portfolio companies toward the banking department. 116 The 
best antidote for this problem would be to facilitate voting by all institu-
tional investors, so that none would have an advantage. A further fear is 
that commercial departments will pass confidential information to trust de-
partments, which the latter can use for a trading advantage. 117 Since this 
danger is unrelated to institutional voting power, it has no bearing on the 
instant inquiry. 
From another angle, institutional shareholders are criticized for being 
unresponsive to "social responsibility" questions such as pollution, labor 
relations, and apartheid in South Africa. 118 To a large segment of eco-
nomic and juristic opinion this bias, if it exists, would be a virtue rather 
than a vice. 119 For those who favor "social responsibility," the question 
should be whether the total effect of increasing institutional influence would 
be positive or negative. One can reasonably suppose that the consensus of 
institutional managers would be less responsive than the impulses of some 
corporate managers, and more responsive than the impulses of some other 
corporate managers. One may also assume that institutional managers will 
give corporate managers some leeway to indulge their social concerns when 
the costs to investors are not noticeable. But one is left with the suspicion 
that influential institutional investors would be likely to block bold ventures 
in risking investor interests for the sake of employees, consumers, or neigh-
bors. Social reformers may be right in guessing that they can obtain their 
objectives more easily under a regime of managerialism (the rule of manag-
ers) than under a regime of capitalism (the rule of investors). 
A concern that the author has encountered more in private conversa-
tions than in published comments is that financial institutions are inclined 
to favor short-term gains at the expense of long-term advantages. They are 
said to favor tender offers or partial liquidations that offer a quick return in 
preference to long-term prosperity of the enterprise. Similarly, they are 
said to oppose constructive policies that will depress real or apparent earn-
ings in the short term because of the negative effect of such policies on share 
prices. 
Biases of this sort are likely to be shared in different degrees by different 
institutions, which have varying investment objectives. The more numer-
ous the institutions participating in control, the greater will be the conform-
ity of institutional interests to the interests of other shareholders. Even if a 
majority of institutions have a bias that diverges from the interests of other 
investors, their bias seems likely to be a wholesome counterpoise to the bias 
of managers toward saving their jobs and enlarging their domains. 
3. .Deferential Supervision 
Independent directors may be not only passive, but deferential. They 
may vote to approve or ratify whatever the directors propose, and never 
116. E. HERMAN, supra note 114, at 38. 
117. See E. HERMAN, supra note 114, at 73-87. 
118. VOTING RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 571-72; cf. Brudney, supra note 69, at 639-58. 
119. See Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32. 
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resign in protest because they value their relations with managers more 
highly than their own opinions or the interests of investors. Executives of 
large corporations can easily find lawyers, physicians, and officers of small 
corporations who will enjoy the honors and emoluments of directorships 
and who will respect the wisdom of their patrons. 
Executives of the most visible corporations today do not seem to be fill-
ing their boards with deferential directors. On the contrary, they seem to 
value the prestige that they and their companies derive from having a board 
that contains some illustrious members. Executives probably value, too, 
advice that is contributed by directors who think for themselves. 
Against these advantages of a free-thinking board, the executives will 
weigh the extraordinary blessings that deferential "independent" directors 
can confer on executives by absolving them from past and present 
transgressions. 
a. Independent directors and derivative suits. Under a recent extension 
of the "business judgment rule," a derivative suit may be dismissed without 
determining its merits if a committee of disinterested directors has found 
that maintenance of the suit would not be in the best interests of the corpo-
ration.120 According to a Delaware refinement, the court will sometimes 
examine the circumstances of the committee's decision to determine 
whether the members inquired, were informed, and reached a decision that 
was reasonable on the facts available to them. But it will accept the com-
mittee's decision without examining its reasonableness if the board of direc-
tors that appointed the disinterested committee contained a majority of 
disinterested directors. 121 
These cases provide the managers with a ritual that will insulate them 
from derivative suits.122 The first step in the ritual is to elect to the board a 
majority of nonexecutives who have no significant financial interest in the 
corporation, and a deferential attitude toward the incumbent managers. 
The next step is to withhold important decisions from the whole board, so 
that a majority of the board will seldom have been implicated in a decision. 
The third step - to be taken when a derivative suit is filed - is to appoint 
deferential directors to a special litigation committee to consider whether 
maintenance of the suit is in the best interests of the corporation. The 
board may simultaneously authorize the special committee to recommend 
that the corporation demand any damages or restitution that the committee 
120. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 
N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). 
121. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). The court indicated that it 
would examine the merits of the litigation committee's decision in cases where making a de-
mand on directors before suing was excused by complicity of a majority of directors who 
participated in the alleged wrong, but that the court would not examine the merits in cases 
where a preliminary demand had to be made because a majority of directors were disinterested 
in the subject of the suit. 430 A.2d at 784. 
122. See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Propo-
sal far Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261,262 (1981); Cox, Searchingfor the Corpora-
tion's Voice in Derivative Suits: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 
969-72. 
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finds appropriate, or take other remedial action. 123 Under these circum-
stances, the committee could hardly doubt that it is able to solve the 
problems of mismanagement more advantageously than would a derivative 
suit prosecuted by the pesky lawyer who has filed it. 
The principle of dismissal on the recommendation of "independent" di-
rectors has been embraced, with modifications, by the recommendations of 
the American Law Institute. 124 Under the Institute's formulation, the court 
will determine whether the litigation committee has offered a sufficient jus-
tification for its conclusion.125 But it is the sufficiency of the report, rather 
than the merits of the suit itself, that the court evaluates.126 The rule places 
a high premium on the casuistry of the committee's report-writers. 
b. Independent directors and the validity of transactions involving con-
jlicts of interest. Notwithstanding developments in the dismissal of deriva-
tive suits, there are still some possibilities of bringing before a court the 
validity of transactions in which executives have a conflict of interest. One 
possibility arises when control passes to a new group via a takeover or sale 
of control; a second arises when the enterprise fails and a trustee in bank-
ruptcy is appointed; a third arises when a plaintiff somehow surmountti the 
obstacles in the way of a derivative suit. 
When a transaction involving a conflict of interest is challenged, defer-
ential decisions of independent directors assume special importance. Most 
states have corporation code provisions on conflicts of interest, which de-
clare that transactions are not invalid by reason of the conflict if (among 
other conditions) they are approved by disinterested directors. 127 Courts 
have generally held that these provisions do not validate transactions that 
are unfair to a corporation; they merely make validity tum on fairness 
rather than on absence of conflict. 128 "Fairness" in this context may be a 
very loose requirement; in one case, the Delaware court indicated that it 
123. See Joy v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312, 1315 (D. Conn. 1981), where a committee was 
appointed to "review, investigate and analyze,'' and recommended that the derivative suit be 
continued as to seven defendants, although dismissed as to 23, aff d., 692 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 
1982); Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), where audit committee was 
appointed in settlement of SEC proceedings, and to recommend whether action should be 
taken against any person, and committee recommended demanding restitution of over 
$1,000,000 from defendants, affd., 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982). 
124. Tent. Draft No. I, supra note 9, at § 7.03(b). 
125. Tent. Draft No. I, supra note 9, at § 7.03(c)(ii). 
126. The requirement of§ 7.03(c)(ii) is stated as follows in Tent. Draft No. I, supra note 9: 
(ii) The business justification advanced by the committee in its report warrants dismis-
sal of the action, and in the court's independent judgment such justification (A) is not 
outweighed by the probable recovery or other relief that the court determines is likely to 
result from the litigation, (B) does not frustrate any authoritatively established public pol-
icy, and (C) is advanced in good faith .... 
(Emphasis added.) 
127. General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1974); MODEL BUSINESS 
CORP. ACT§ 41 (1979). 
128. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 
(1952); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill 
International, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968). 
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meant the absence of a gratuitous gift or waste. 129 But the transaction must 
be, in the Delaware court's phrase, "objectively fair," 130 meaning presum-
ably that the court compares values exchanged, rather than appraising the 
intentions or the reasoning of the independent directors. 
The extension of the business judgment rule that has been made in dis-
missing derivative suits131 suggests that the judgment of independent direc-
tors might be given a similar effect in determining the validity of 
transactions affected with a conflict of interest. If this should occur, a self-
serving transaction of the executives might survive a judicial attack because 
the independent directors could reasonably have believed that it was fair, 
regardless of what the court thinks. In Cohen v. Ayres, 132 the court seems to 
have glided unconsciously into this position by equating a ratification by 
independent directors with a ratification by shareholders. 133 The ALI re-. 
porters have embraced the test of what disinterested directors could reason-
ably believe to be fair to the corporation. 134 
c. Effects on selection of directors. Executives select directors, or influ-
ence the selection of directors, for two main goals. One is for these direc-
tors' advice on how to run the company; the other is to protect themselves 
from liability and from losing the benefits of personal advantages. 
One might suppose that both objectives would be served by selecting 
individuals with wide experience, high intelligence, and the courage to 
reach conclusions that differ from those of the executives. The directors 
who resigned from Bendix - including a chief executive of Mobil and two 
former United States cabinet members - seemed to fit this mold. 135 Simi-
lar directors might be expected to help the executives run the company 
wisely, and to dissuade them from pursuing courses that will result in their 
incurring liability or suffering annulment of their transactions. 
If, however, courts refuse to examine the merits of transactions that 
have been approved by "independent" directors, executives will have a 
strong incentive to select independent directors who are unlikely to make 
use of their independence. Executives will have much to gain by filling the 
seats with agreeable and deferential individuals who will never doubt that 
the executives are right. Choices of this kind can make "independent" su-
pervision more dangerous to investor welfare than inside directors, to 
129. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (1952). This decision was not based 
on the statute, but on prestatutory case law. 
130. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d at 221. 
131. See notes 121-22 supra. 
132. 596 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1979). 
133. See 596 F.2d at 739-40. Since the case before the court involved ratification by share-
holders, the reference to ratification by independent directors was unnecessary to the decision. 
See also Sparks, Recent Developments in Substantive Business Judgment Rule, 61 N.C. L. REV. 
534, 537 (1983). 
134. Tent. Draft No. 3, supra note 9, at§§ 5.08(a) & 5.08(c). The former paragraph implies 
that the director or officer does not violate a duty if disinterested directors could reasonably 
believe the transaction to be fair to the corporation; the latter implies that the transaction 
cannot be set aside if there was no violation of duty. Since the test is fairness to the corpora-
tion, there is no basis of attack on the basis of unfairness to minority stockholders. 
135. See note 95 supra. 
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whose business judgment courts will not defer on conflicts of interest. 136 
d. Promoting e.ffective supervision in the United States. Whether effec• 
tive supervision of management is possible in the United States for very 
large, very widely held corporations is debatable. It will not be brought 
about merely by electing a majority of directors who are "independent." 
That condition may even impair supervision, if courts continue to extend 
the "business judgment rule" to transactions in which executives have con-
flicts of interest. Effective supervision will not take place unless it is accom-
panied by additional measures to activate it. 
The first prerequisite of effective supervision is to remove juridical risks 
that would deter any possible impulse toward activism on the part of finan-
cial institutions. Instead of busying itself with the demands of individual 
shareholders to circulate whimsical proposals at company expense, the SEC 
might turn its mind to liberating the large shareholders, who are presuma-
bly interested in maximizing returns, to exercise the powers that are en-
trusted to them by the corporation codes. This involves relieving them, at 
the least, from the duty to announce a coalition prematurely, 137 the liability 
to surrender "profits" on short-swing trades, 138 and the consequences at-
tached to "control."139 
Since none of the provisions that create these risks is deliberately aimed 
at financial institutions' participation in supervision, the measures are sus-
ceptible to revisions which would permit financial institutions to play the 
role that corporation law assigns to shareholders. Concert to supervise 
management, as distinguished from concert to acquire shares, should be 
exempted from section 13(d) reporting. Financial institutions should not be 
considered to be directors by deputization under Exchange Act section 
16(b) when their influence over directors is exercised by a combination of 
rival institutions. Under the same conditions they should not be deemed to 
be in "control," with the secondary liability and the inhibition on selling 
that accompanies that status. 
Liberation of financial institutions from securities law risks would be 
only the first step forward. Institutions would still confront the formidable 
task of assembling a majority of votes. In the absence of cumulative voting, 
institutions could not put directors on the board unless holders of a major-
ity of shares could reach agreement on a single slate of nominees. This 
would be a much more formidable undertaking in the United States, with 
its dispersion of financial institutions, than in Germany, where a half-dozen 
banks often vote a majority of the shares.140 
The ability of different groups of institutions to elect independent direc-
136. Cf. Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1894 (1983) (discussing the residual influence of board approval on judicial 
decisions involving conflicts of interest). 
137. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 712-19 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 
910 (1972). 
138. See Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 
1036 (1970). 
139. See notes 10S-06 supra. 
140. BERICHT DER STUDIENKOMMISSION, supra note 77, at 113. 
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tors without assembling a unified majority would be facilitated if every 
block of five or ten percent of the shares had the power to choose a director. 
This power could be given by the simple expedient of restoring the cumula-
tive voting right, which was guaranteed by the constitutions of several states 
only a few decades ago. 141 
The once-prevalent institution of cumulative voting has succumbed 
chiefly to the competition of Delaware. What other states might do if they 
were not afraid of driving away business is suggested by California's en-
forcement of cumulative voting in corporations of other states that have a 
majority of their economic contacts with California.142 
A secondary nemesis of cumulative voting has been the argument that 
rival forces on the board will destroy its effectiveness in managing corporate 
affairs.143 This argument would have a good deal of validity in a corpora-
tion in which the board engages in management. But in most corporations, 
and especially the larger ones, management in the usual sense is carried on 
by executives acting singly or in small committees. This distinction was rec-
ognized by amendments of corporation codes in the 1960's to provide that 
the business of the corporation was to be managed by or under the direction 
of "the board."144 If management decisions are made by a coherent group 
of executives, they will not be impeded by some difference and debate 
among the nonmanaging directors. Although debate will take more time 
than deference or passivity, it may be an indispensable cost of effective 
supervision. 
Whatever may be the merits of these suggested methods of effectuating 
supervision, a harder problem is discovering forces that might lead to their 
adoption. There is no organized lobby for the reform of corporation law. 
Individual investors are widely dispersed, and most of them mistakenly as-
sume that their interests are identical with those of corporate executives. 
Financial institutions perceive political hostility to increasing their power 
over enterprises, 145 and no gain in their institutional rewards for handling 
investors' money. Reformers who denounce the autarchy of executives ex-
pend their energies on impractical plans for the simultaneous representa-
tion of investors, employees, consumers, communities, and others. 
If reform is to come about, it must come because a wide public, includ-
ing far-sighted executives, become concerned with the efficiency of the 
United States industrial establishment. Inefficiency in the management of 
one enterprise raises the costs that other enterprises pay, in the same way 
that inefficient labor or burdensome regulation does. Executives as a group 
might see the advantage of effective supervision as a means of cutting down 
on the national waste that has become so conspicuous in takeover battles. 
141. For a general history and review of cumulative voting rights, see C. WILLIAMS, CU-
MULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS (1951). 
142. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (Deering Supp. 1984); Halloran & Hammer, Section 
21 I 5 of the New California General Corporation Law - The Application of California Corpora-
tion Law to Foreign Corporations, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1282, 1295-99 (1976). 
143. See C. WILLIAMS, supra note 141, at 182-83; Haft, ·supra note 69, at 24. 
144. General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1974); MODEL BUSINESS 
CORP. Acr § 35 (1979). 
145. See P. BLUMBERG, supra note 96, at 141-44. 
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The champions of employees' and consumers' causes might see increased 
efficiency as beneficial to them because it would swell the benefits available 
to all of the corporate constituencies. But no movement in this direction is 
visible on the horizon. 
In the absence of effective supervision by financial institutions, the best 
chance for supervision lies in executives' voluntarily choosing directors who 
will exercise independent judgment about the executives' recommendations 
and decisions. Choices of this kind would be more likely to occur if "in-
dependent directors" were deprived of the power of absolution that is con-
ferred on them by recent extensions of the "business judgment rule." 
But the extensions of the business judgment rule will not be cut back 
unless other means are found for dealing with the problems that give birth 
to the extensions. The foremost of these is abuse of derivative suits by 
plaintiffs' attorneys who file suits on trivial grounds in the expectation of 
obtaining settlements and fee awards. This problem should be attacked at 
the source by reforming the practice of courts in awarding fees 146 or, more 
radically, by restricting the capacity to file derivative suits, as in Western 
Europe.147 
Another problem that may have inspired the extensions of the business 
judgment rule is the astronomic liability that executives and directors could 
incur if the black-letter rules oflaw were allowed to operate. Since a palpa-
ble mistake in the management of a multibillion-dollar corporation would 
involve multimillions of dollars, the general theory of damages would make 
participating executives individually liable for the whole amount. 
The extended business judgment rule offers an escape from this intolera-
ble result, but at the cost of excluding most corporate decisions from any 
kind of judicial evaluation. A better approach would be to limit severely 
the damage liability of directors148 while leaving the courts free to decide 
for themselves whether corporate transactions are valid. 
The preceding discussion of measures that might enhance supervision 
146. See Conard, Winnowing .Derivative Suits through Fee Awards, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. (1984) (forthcoming). 
147. French law auihorizes a derivative suit to be brought by shareholders aggregating 5% 
of the equity, and forbids impairment of this power by charter clause or shareholder vote. 
French Law on Commercial Companies, supra note SI; French Law on Commercial Companies, 
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) art. 245, at I 16 (Jan. I, 1971) (Decree No. 66-537); French Law on 
Commercial Companies, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) art. 200, at 271 (Jan. I, 1971) (Decree No. 
66-236); J. CRABB, FRENCH BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 73, 175 (1979). 
German law requires 10% of !he shareholders to bring a derivative suit. AktG § 147(1), 
1965 BGBI I I 124 (W. Ger.). For evidence that some derivative suits are maintained notwith-
standing the height of this threshold, see Buxbaum, Extension of Parent Company S/1are/1old-
ers' Rights lo Participate in the Governance of Subsidiaries, 31 AM. J. COMP, L. 511 (1983), The 
proposed law for incorporation of"European companies" does not provide for derivative suits, 
but for court appointment of a commission of inquiry on request of shares aggregating 10% of 
those outstanding, or a value of about $200,000. Statute for European Companies, art. 97, 
BULL. EUR. COMM. 4/75, at 55. 
In Great Britain, a single shareholder may petition for redress of prejudicial actions of the 
corporation, but will not be permitted to maintain a derivative suit on this ground unless the 
court finds that the petition is ''well founded." Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, § 75. 
148. See Tent. Draft No. I, supra note 9, at§ 7.06(d)-7.06(e); FEDERAL SECURlTIES CODE 
§ !708(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1978); see also Conard, A .Behavioral Analysis of .Directors' 
Liability far Negligence, 1972 DUKE L. J. 895, 912-15. 
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has omitted any mention of proposals to increase the input of small individ-
ual investors. One suggestion along this line would give equal voting power 
to each shareholder, equating voting power of the individual owner of 100 
shares with that of the institutional owner of 10,000.149 Another program 
would require institutional investors to consult their constituents and vote 
the institutions' shares in other companies as the institutions' shareholders 
or pensioners direct. 150 Upon analysis, these proposals seem to bear little 
relation to the efficiency or fairness of management. A small investor who 
would undertake to find qualified independent directors and organize a vot-
ing block to elect them would have to devote time and effort that would be 
worth more than his total investment. Small investor proposals are directed 
less to protecting investors' .financial interests than to shifting the balance of 
power on "social responsibility" issues such as recognizing unions, manu-
facturing munitions, and operating in South Africa. Since the present essay 
is limited to super_vision for investors' .financial interests, the small investor 
proposals fall outside its scope. 
III. EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN SUPERVISION 
In several European countries, the venerable institution of supervision 
in the interests of investors is in the process of modification to reflect also 
the interests of employees. 151 Germany was the first to make a major modi-
fication, introducing employee representatives to supervisory boards as 
early as 1950.152 In 1971, the Netherlands followed less radically by en-
abling employees to interpose a conditional veto on nominations to the su-
pervisory board. 153 In 1972, the European Economic Community 
Commission recommended that employee representation be made 
mandatory in all member countries;154 the 1983 proposal softened the re-
quirement, but retained the conception of an employee voice in the supervi-
sion of management. 155 In the following pages, we will refer to all of these 
149. See Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule 
of "One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV. l, 45 (1970). 
150. See STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 30, at 412-17, 424. 
151. See E. BATSTONE & P.L. DAVIES, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
(1976) (reporting on worker representation on boards in Austria, Denmark, France, West Ger-
many, The Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, with allusions to Israel, Spain and Yugosla-
via); Commission of the European Communities, Employee Participation and -Company 
Structure, Bull. Eur. Com. Supp. 8/75 [hereinafter cited as Employee Participation]; INQUIRY 
ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY COMMITTEE, FIRST REPORT, CMD. 6706 (1977) [hereinafter cited 
as Bullock Report]. 
152. The history is briefly reviewed in Streeter, Co-determination in West Germany -
Through the Best (and Worst) of Times, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 981 (1982); Gruson & Meilicke, 
The New Co-determination Law in Germany, 32 Bus. LAW. 571 (1977). 
153. See Ottervanger & Pais, Employee Participation in Corporate Decisionmaking: The 
Dutch Model, 15 INTL. LAW. 393, 404 (1981). Under the Netherlands system, successors to 
supervisory board members are nominated by the incumbent members, and submitted to the 
shareholders' meeting and the employees' council for approval. If either body vetoes, the 
nominee cannot be appointed unless an administrative agency finds that the veto lacks suffi-
cient cause. 
154. Fifth Directive 1972, supra note 10, art. 4(2). 
155. Fifth Directive 1983, supra note 21. 
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forms of worker participation as "codetermination," although purists would 
use this term more restrictively. 
A. The Theory of Codetermination 
The theory underlying codetermination is often misunderstood by 
Americans. They are likely to visualize it (if at all) as a means of encum-
bering board meetings with union leaders who persist in pressing at board 
meetings the same insatiable demands that they advance in collective bar-
gaining sessions. 
The European conception is very different. Codetermination is viewed 
as a means of breaking out of the cage of two-sided confrontation into a 
fellowship of cooperation for common ends. It is based, as Clyde Summers 
has written, on the assumption "that workers and management in an enter-
prise have common as well as competing interests; and the employment 
relation is envisioned not so much as one of confrontation between workers 
and management as one of integration of workers in the enterprise."156 Al-
though workers have some interests that conflict with those of investors, the 
same is true of managers. Workers are at least as dependent on the prosper-
ity of the firm as managers are; they may be more so, because they are less 
mobile. 157 
The difference between the German model of codetermination and the 
Chrysler experiment of putting a union officer on the board 158 is empha-
sized by the ways in which the employee representatives are chosen under 
the German system. They are not selected by the management (as in the 
Chrysler case), nor appointed by the the union leaders, but chosen by an 
election in which all employees may vote. 159 Moreover, different sets of 
employees are represented by different delegates. White-collar employees 
(Angestel/te) and blue-collar workers (Arbeiter) have separate representa-
tives, and employees with managerial functions (/eitende Angestel/te) have 
one of their own. 160 The resulting representation of nonunion employees 
was categorically rejected by the British labor movement161 and perhaps 
others; the 1983 proposal of the EEC Commission omits any express re-
quirement of separating employees by function. It retains a requirement of 
156. Summers, supra note 29, at 371. 
157. "In particular, employees are increasingly seen to have interests in the functioning of 
enterprises which can be as substantial as those of shareholders, and sometimes more so." 
Employee Participation, supra note 151, at 9; cf. Bullock Report, supra note 151, at 27 (since 
capital and labor are in some sense equal partners, employees are entitled to representation on 
company boards). 
158. Codeterminalion hits U.S.; Fraser on the Chrysler Board, IRON AoE, Nov. 5, 1979, at 
17. 
159. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [Mitbest G] §§ 8-15, 1976 BGBl I, pt. 1, at 1155-56 (YI, Ger.); 
H. MEILECKE & W. MEILICKE, KOMMENTAR ZUM MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ 100-02 (1976); 
Gruson & Meilicke, The New Co-Determination Law in Germany, 32 Bus. LAW. 571, 574 
(1977). 
160. Mitbest G § 15(2), 1976 BGBl I, pt. 1, at 1157 (YI. Ger.). 
161. TRADES UNION CONGRESS, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 46 (2d ed. 1977); Bullock Re-
port, supra note 151, at 109-13. The Bullock Report was issued by a committee appointed and 
reporting to a Labour government. The minority's statement took particular exception to the 
nonrepresentation of nonunion employees. Id. at 175-76. 
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proportional representation for the protection of "minorities,"162 which 
presumably connote ethnic or gender classes, rather than job groups. 
B. Codetermination in the United States 
There is hardly any European idea that has received a colder reception 
in the United States than codetermination. Before Fraser's appointment to 
the Chrysler board, its use in the United States was rarely considered worth 
suggesting.163 American executives do not live under the shadow of a mili-
tant socialism that drives European leaders to accept alternative alleviations 
of the class conflict. Labor leaders have traditionally opposed codetermina-
tion suggestions, either on the ground that labor directors would be seduced 
by management, or that their constituents would suspect them of being se-
duced.164 If they contemplated employee representation on the German 
model, which bypasses union machinery, they would probably be even 
more hostile. 165 
A variety of legal provisions in the United States would impede U.S. 
corporations from adopting codetermination on any of the European mod-
els, even if they wanted to. 166 Corporation codes provide for election of 
directors only by shareholders167 or, rarely, bondholders.168 In accordance 
with these laws, the rare labor representative on boards must have been 
"elected" by the votes of the shareholders' proxies, not by the votes of 
workers. In fact, Fraser's directorship was offered to him by Iacocca, the 
company president, who refused to consider giving it to any alternative la-
bor representative. 169 
Another possible obstacle to employee representation on the board is 
162. Fiflh Directive 1983, supra note 21, art. 4i(a). 
163. The present author's suggestion lhat U.S. industry might "move experimentally in a 
similar direction" was unnoticed except for one reviewer's firm rejection. See A. CONARD, 
CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTlVE 366 (1976); Vagts, Book Review, 33 Bus. LAW. 2063, 2064 
(1978) (reviewing A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE (1976)). For recent comments, 
see Forst, Labor Union Representation on Boards of Competitors: An Antitrust Analysis, 7 J. 
CoRP. L. 421 (1982); Comment, Broadening the Board· Labor Participation in Corporate Gov-
ernance, 34 Sw. L.J. 963 (1980); Note, Labor Unions in the Boardroom: An Antitrust Dilemma, 
92 YALE L.J. 106 (1982). 
164. See Fraser, Worker Participation in Corporate Government: The {I.A. W.-Chrysler Ex-
perience, 58 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 949, 955 (1982); see also Summers, supra note 29, at 370-71 
(noting that lhe American labor system emphasizes confrontation rather than cooperation); 
Summers, Worker Participation in Corporate Management - The United States Version, I J. 
COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 157, 176 (1978). 
165. The British trade unions and Labour government's Bullock Committee report have 
insisted lhat employee representation be articulated through union machinery. TRADES 
UNION CONGRESS, supra note 161, at 35; Bullock Report, supra note 151, at 109-13. 
166. See Comment, supra note 163, at 964-72 (1980) (citing problems of fiduciary duty, 
labor law and antitrust law); Note, supra note 163, at 111-24. 
167. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 36 (1979). Conceivably the exclusive power 
of shareholders could be side-stepped by a charter provision under lhe "otherwise provided" 
clause of MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 35 (1979), giving the power to manage or to supervise 
management to some organ olher lhan lhe board of directors. The validity of such an arrange• 
ment is arguable. 
168. General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221 (1974). 
169. Fraser, supra note 164, at 954. 
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the Clayton Act prohibition of interlocking directorships. 170 When the ap-
pointment of Fraser to the Chrysler board was followed by a proposal to 
put another UAW representative on the American Motors Corporation 
board, the latter action was blocked by the refusal of the Department of 
Justice to give it clearance.171 The refusal was based on the hypothesis that 
both representatives would be deputies of the union, which would then hold 
directorships on competing corporations. Obviously, this obstacle would be 
surmounted if employee representatives were elected directly by employees, 
without union interposition. 172 But that form of employee representation 
has gone unnoticed by most U.S. commentators. 
With a fertile imagination, one can envision a state passing a law that 
authorizes corporate charters to provide for election of one third of the di-
rectors by employees, and some corporation putting this kind of a clause in 
its charter. What would be the result? In a company with a history of de-
structive strikes, such as a major automobile or steel company, one might 
expect antagonism to carry over to the board of directors. The union that 
represents employees in bargaining would probably elect a solid panel of 
union nominees, who would view their function as bargaining in directors' 
meetings for employees' rewards. Like some congressmen, they might de-
mand a boon for their constituents as the price of a vote on any subject. 
In a company without any employee organization, codetermination 
might be equally unproductive. The elected representatives would be likely 
to use their board positions to promote advancement for themselves rather 
than to exercise control over their bosses. 
Effective codetermination probably requires a reasonably strong em-
ployee organization to whom employee board members are answerable. 
But the organization must be one that sees its function as including promo-
tion of the enterprise as well as of workers' emoluments. In Germany, co-
operative interaction of managers and employees at the summit is 
reinforced by cooperation at the shop level. 173 In shop committees, opera-
tives confer directly with bosses, without intermediaries. 174 In the United 
States, this kind of relationship would require changes in attitudes 175 and 
also, probably, in labor laws. By making most terms of employment a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining with a union, 176 U.S. labor laws 
impede direct employer-employee accommodation.177 
170. 15 u.s.c. § 19 (1982). 
171. Forst, supra note 163, at 427-28; Fraser, supra note 164, at 958. 
172. q: Note, supra note 163, at 124-27 (representatives should not be chosen by national 
officials nor by representatives of the national union). 
173. Summers, supra note 29, at 373-81. 
174. The Bullock Report rejected the European institution of shop committees on the 
ground that they would undermine the British institution of the shop steward, who is a union 
agent. Bullock Report, supra note 151, at llO. 
175. See, e.g., SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND 
WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 17-20 (1973). For faint signs of changing attitudes, see Compa-
nies Widen Worker Role in J)ecisions, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1984, at l, col. 3. 
176. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act§ 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). 
177. See Summers, supra note 29, at 381. 
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C. Employee Share Ownership 
Efforts to ally employees with management in the United States have 
usually taken the form of promoting employee share ownership. U.S. tax 
laws have been repeatedly revised in order to facilitate various forms of 
employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). 178 The shares are usually held 
in trust, at least initially. In "registered" companies, the employees are en-
titled to instruct the trustee how to vote their respective fractions of the 
shares; but since the employees have no ready-made way of joining forces, 
trustees will probably give their proxies to the directors' committee just as 
the other dispersed shareholders do. 179 ESOPs seem to be designed more to 
elevate employees' concern with profits than to give them a voice in 
control. 180 
Another avenue through which employees are gaining beneficial owner-
ship of industry consists of pension funds. 181 If these funds were invested 
chiefly in shares of the same company that employs the prospective pen-
sioners, they might have fulfilled the prediction of Peter Drucker's subti-
tle-"how pension fund socialism came to America." 182 But since 
ERISA, 183 most of the funds are diversified and are administered by finan-
cial institutions, whose passivity in relation to the management of the enter-
prises in which they invest has already been noted. 184 
Since employees' financial contributions to corporate capital do not give 
them any effective voice in control, and U.S. law gives them no participa-
tion in internal governance, defense of their interests depends on the effec-
tiveness with which their leaders confront corporate managers. This 
arrangement is presumably more gratifying to leaders on both sides than a 
more cooperative structure would be. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The ten nations of the European Community appear to be moving to-
ward structures of enterprise organization in which representatives of inves-
tors and of employees have effective powers over executives. The 
reinforcement of investors' supervision is designed to maximize executive 
competence, loyalty, and impartiality. The strengthening of employees' su-
178. I.R.C. §409A (1982); see Humphreys, From TRASOP to CESOP, 57 TAXES 319 
(1979). 
179. For an analysis of voting rights before recent amendments, see Note, Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans, Voting Rights, and Plant Closings, II U. MICH. J.L.REF. 162 (1977). 
180. Cf. Note, supra note 179, at 168 (although ESOP may pose a higher risk than a diver-
sified plan, the value of full voting rights offered by ESOPs which give employees a greater 
voice in management may outweigh the increased investment risk). 
181. For a history of the growth of pension plans, see generally P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN 
REVOLUTION: How PENSION FUND SOCIALISM CAME TO AMERICA (1976). 
182. Id 
183. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-461, and in scattered sections of titles 5, 18, 26, 31, and 42 
U.S.C.). 29 U.S.C. § 1107 imposes restrictions on investment in securities of the employer; 29 
U.S.C. § 1103 requires the establishment of a trust to be administered by a named trustee. 
184. See text at notes 95-110 supra. 
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pervision is designed to move industrial relations away from bipolar con-
frontation toward mutual cooperation. 
In the United States, the principal movements are in the opposite direc-
tion. Although "independent directors" are being named to corporate 
boards, the hobbling of institutional investors insures that the independent 
directors will make little use of their independence. Extensions of the busi-
ness judgment rule increase the probability that independent directors will 
reinforce the autarchy of corporate executives. 
With respect to employee participation in supervision, there is not even 
a semblance of interest in the United States. Corporation and labor laws 
alike are designed to exclude employee interests from being represented 
within the corporate decision-making structure. 
The result of the developments in United States law is to widen the gap 
between the governance of business enterprise in Europe and the United 
States. While Europe is enhancing the participation of both capital and 
labor in corporate decision making, the United States is moving toward the 
exclusion of both forces from expression within the enterprise. Capitalists 
are increasingly left to the protective force of the euphemistically desig-
nated "efficient market." Labor is awarded the opportunity of protecting 
itself by the force of organization, and the threat of strikes. Both tendencies 
magnify the role of "leaders" who may be expected to identify the interests 
of their constituents with strengthening their own powers. 
Whether these tendencies enhance or diminish the productivity of U.S. 
enterprise may never be known, but will surely be debated in 1984 and 
beyond. 
